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Forcible Sexual Abuse. Although the Information was read to the 
Appellant, the trial judge did not elicit a factual basis for the 
plea on the record. Accordingly, the trial court abused its 
discretion by refusing to permit the Appellant to withdraw a 
defective Rule 11(e) plea. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant pleaded guilty to the charge of Forcible Sexual 
Abuse, a second degree felony, on August 3, 1984, and was ordered 
to serve the indeterminate term provided by law of 1-15 years at 
the Utah State Prison. The Appellant has served his sentence at 
the Utah State Prison and is presently on parole. The Appellant's 
liberty is impaired as a result of a variety of restrictions 
imposed as a condition of his parole. 
On May 3, 1989, the Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his 
previously entered guilty plea. The basis of the motion was that 
the trial court had failed to comply with the rules and regulations 
imposed upon the trial court by Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
On July 26, 1989, the trial court heard evidence to set aside 
the plea. The Appellant testified he had an eighth grade education 
as well as some carpentry classes at a trade school (R.4.). He 
testified his lawyer did not advise him of the rights he waived by 
pleading guilty (R.6). He testified his lawyer never specifically 
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advised him of the title of the crime to which he pleaded; nor was 
there any discussion of the elements of the offense (R.7). The 
Appellant denied knowing the elements of Forcible Sexual Abuse, nor 
what facts he admitted by entering his plea on August 3, 1984 • 
(R.7). He stated that he pleaded guilty to protect his family from 
any further suffering (R.8). Detective Wall also testified• He 
related that the Appellant told him he had touched the genitals and 
breasts of his daughter (R.17). The detective had no doubt that 
the Appellant understood the nature of the acts he had performed 
with his daughter (R.17). The detective claimed he reviewed with 
the Appellant the elements of all the different crimes that the 
Appellant could have faced (R.18). The detective remembered that 
the Appellant was crying and very emotional during the interview-
confession and during the discussion of the elements to the various 
crimes (R.28). The detective conceded that he did not know what 
the Appellant understood he was pleading guilty to on the date of 
the entry of the guilty plea (R.29). 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, after listening 
to the arguments of counsel, the trial court denied the Appellant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and ruled that the record as 
a whole demonstrated that the Appellant entered his guilty plea 
with a full understanding of his rights, including the right 
against self-incrimination; and that the Appellant was aware of the 
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nature and elements of the offense at the time he entered his 
guilty plea. See Appendix 1. The Appellant appeals that finding 
and the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RECORD AS A WHOLE DOES NOT AFFIRMATIVELY ESTABLISH 
APPELLANT'S FULL KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA UNDER RULE 11(e)(3) AND (4) 
At the time that the Appellant pleaded guilty to Forcible 
Sexual Abuse, the trial court erred by failing to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 11(e)(3) which states: 
The court..•shall not accept [a plea of 
guilty] until the court has made the findings: 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a 
jury trial and to confront and cross-examine 
in open court the witnesses against him, and 
that by entering the plea he waives all of 
those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature 
and elements of the offense to which he is 
entering the plea; that upon trial the prose-
cution would have the burden of proving each 
of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
The record evidence from the change of plea hearing clearly 
establishes that the trial court failed to find that the Appellant 
understood the nature and elements of Forcible Sexual Abuse and 
that by entering a guilty plea he necessarily waived his constitu-
4 
tional rights 1) against compulsory self-incrimination; 2) to a 
jury trial; and 3) to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
witnesses against him. Failure to comply with the mandates of Rule 
11(e) is good cause to set the plea aside. 
The appropriate inquiry to assess Rule 11(e) compliance is 
whether the record as a whole affirmatively establishes that the 
Appellant entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding 
of its consequences. Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985) 
and Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985). In State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that "11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of insuring 
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when 
a guilty plea is entered." Id at 1312. Admittedly, because Gibbons 
was decided after the guilty plea was entered in this case, the 
strict compliance Rule 11(e) established under Gibbons does not 
control. However, the rationale expressed in Gibbons is instruc-
tive in this case. 
The basis for the Gibbons duty imposed upon trial courts is 
found in Boykin v. Alabama, supra, where the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated: 
What is at stake for an accused facing [pun-
ishment] demands the utmost solicitude of 
which courts are capable in canvassing the 
matter with the accused to make sure he has a 
full understanding of what the plea connotes 
and of its consequence. 
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395 U.S. at 243-244. 
The significance attached to an accused understanding the 
nature of the charge to which he pleads guilty seems more than 
obvious. In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), the United 
States Supreme Court observed: 
"Clearly the plea could not be voluntary in 
the sense that it constituted an intelligent 
admission that he committed the offense unless 
the Defendant received real notice of the true 
nature of the charge against him, the first 
and most universally recognized requirement of 
due process." 
Moreover, Rule 11(e)(4) mandates that in order for a defendant 
to make a knowing guilty plea, he must understand the elements of 
the crime charged and the relationship of the law to the facts. 
In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), the United 
States Supreme Court stressed that the factual elements of the 
charges against the Defendant must be explained in the taking of 
a guilty plea so that the Defendant understands and admits those 
elements: 
. . .the judge must determine "that the con-
duct which the defendant admits constitute the 
offense charged in the Indictment or Informa-
tion or offense included therein to which the 
Defendant has pleaded guilty." . . . 
There is no adequate substitute for demon-
strating in the record at the time the plea is 
entered the Defendant's understanding of the 
nature of the charge against him. (Emphasis 
in the original). 
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The total absence of any colloquy between the Court and the 
Appellant concerning the facts and the elements in the instant 
matter are to be contrasted with the exchange between the trial 
judge and the defendant in Jolivet v. Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 
(Utah 1989). There the Information was read to the defendant in 
open court at the first arraignment. However, at the defendant's 
request, the Amended Information was not read. The defendant's 
counsel advised the Court that the defendant had read the Amended 
Information and knew its contents. Moreover, the defendant 
personally advised the judge he had read the Amended Information, 
understood its contents, and waived its reading. At the second 
District Court arraignment, the defendant's counsel again requested 
waiving the reading of the Amended Information. However, the judge 
did read it together with the facts relating to the charges. The 
judge asked the defendant if the facts read in open court were 
fairly and fully stated, to which the defendant responded affirma-
tively. On these pre-Gibbons facts, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the record as a whole demonstrated Rule 11(e)(4) compliance. 
In contrast, in the instant matter, the record as a whole does not 
demonstrate that the Appellant understood or admitted facts which 
constituted the offense to which he pleaded guilty. 
The only support in the record at the time the plea was 
entered for the trial judge's finding that Appellant understood the 
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nature and elements of Forcible Sexual Abuse is that the Informa-
tion was read to him at the outset of the guilty plea hearing. 
However, that can hardly be said to compare to the steps taken by 
the trial judge in Jolivet v. Cook, supra, to insure that the 
accused understood the elements of the offense. See McCarthy v. 
United States, supra. Thus, in State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 
(Utah App. 1989), this Court stated at page 1335: 
For example defendant was not specifically 
advised on the record by the court as to the 
nature and the elements of the offense to 
which he pleaded or its consequences, 
mandating that we reverse the conviction and 
refusal to set aside the plea. 
Before the trial court, the State also relied upon the 
Appellant's confession and statement to the agent preparing the 
presentence report to demonstrate that the Appellant understood the 
nature and elements of Forcible Sexual Abuse on the date he entered 
his guilty plea. Appellant submits that reliance on these two 
different events is misplaced. First and foremost, both of these 
events occurred at different chronological times than the date of 
the guilty plea. It is the accused's understanding of the offense 
on the date that he enters his plea that is crucial. His admis-
sions of wrongdoing on a date before and after the entry of his 
guilty plea do not necessarily shed any light on the Appellant's 
understanding of his rights on the date he entered his guilty plea. 
State v. Vasilacapulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "His 
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understanding of the elements of the charges and the relationship 
of the laws and the facts may not be presumed from a silent or 
incomplete examination." State v. Valencia, supra, at page 1335. 
To do so is to speculate. 
The trial court also neglected to advise the Defendant that 
he had a right against compulsory self-incrimination, a right to 
a jury trial, a right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses 
against him in open court, and that by entering a guilty plea, he 
waived all of those rights. "Specific inquiry should be made as 
to whether defendant understands that by his plea he waives his 
rights against self-incrimination, to a jury trial, to appeal, and 
to confront witnesses." State v. Valencia, supra, at 1335. Thus, 
the record shows there was no compliance with Rule 11(e)(3). 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant's plea was not entered in compliance with the 
constitutional and Rule 11(e)(3) and (4) requirements. The record 
as a whole does not demonstrate that the Appellant understood any 
of the elements of Forcible Sexual Abuse on the date that he 
pleaded guilty. Similarly, the record does not demonstrate any 
mention by the trial court that the entry of the guilty plea waived 
the Appellant's constitutional rights against self-incrimination, 
to cross-examination and confrontation of witnesses, and to a jury 
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trial. The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set 
the guilty plea aside. 
DATED this day of , 1990. 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR., 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four (4) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to be mailed, by first 
class postage prepaid, this day of , 1990, to: 
Attorney General's Office 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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APPENDIX 1 
FN TIIF FOURTH JUrUCJAI, DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
STATE OF UTAH,, ) Case Number 9266 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) FINDINGS AND ORDER 
CHARLES EDWARD CONOVER, ) 
Defendant. ) 
******** 
This matter came before the Court, on July 26, 1989, 
for an evidentiary hearing on defendant's Motion to Withdraw 
GuLJty Flea. Deputy Utah County Attorney, Claudia Laycock, 
appeared for the State of Utah. The defendant was present with 
counsel Walter F. Bugden, Jr. After reviewing the pleadings on 
file with the Court, the additional case law presented to the 
Court at the hearing, and after hearing testimony offered by both 
the State and the defendant, the Court finds that the record as a 
whole demonstrates that the defendant entered his guilty plea 
with a full understanding of his rights, including the right 
against self-incrimination, and that he was aware of the nature 
and eLements of the offense at the Lime he entered his guilty 
p I ea . 
Based upon the above, defendant's motion to withdraw 
guilty plea is denied. 
Dated this 19th day of September, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
J/ ROBERT BULLdCK 
SENIOR DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
cc: Claudia Laycock 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
County Building 
Provo, UT 84601 
Walter F. Bugden, Jr. 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
APPENDIX 2 
UTAH RULES OK CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 11 
AX.R. — Antagonistic defenses as ground Key Numbers. — Indictment and Informa-
xx separate trials of codefendants in criminal tion <s=> 124 to 131. 
a*. 82 A.L.R.3d 245. 
Rule 10. Arraignment* 
'a) Upon the return of an indictment or upon receipt of the records from the 
magistrate following a bind-over, the defendant shall forthwith be arraigned 
2 the district court. Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall 
insist of reading the indictment or information to the defendant or stat ing to 
rm the substance of the charge and calling on him to plead thereto. He shall 
5e given a copy of the indictment or information before he is called upon to 
:Jead. 
>b) If upon arraignment the defendant requests additional time in which to 
;!ead or otherwise respond, a reasonable time may be granted. 
c) Any defect or irregularity in or want or absence of any proceeding pro-
r.ded for by statute or these rules prior to arra ignment shall be specifically 
*sd expressly objected to before a plea of guilty is entered or the same is 
raived. 
«d) If a defendant has been released on bail, or on his own recognizance, 
rrior to arraignment and thereafter fails to appear for arraignment or trial 
Then required to do so, a warrant of arrest may issue and bail may be for-
feited. 
T7-35-10, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, 5 1.) 
Cross-References. - Harmless ••rror. Rights of accused. Utah Const . Art. L Sees 7 
i 77-35-30. to l.T. * 77-1-0 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Additional time to plead. U«n. it was equivalent of a new information re-
Where original information did not state quiring arraignment of defendant and his plea 
rjblic offense and was amended so as to state thereto, and where defendant was not given 
rjblicoffense for first time, as amending infor- time to plead to such information, court corn-
ration in larceny prosecution so as to allege mitted reversible error. State v. Jensen. 83 
rmership of property alleged to have been sto- Utah 452, .'JO P.2d 203 (1934). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am J u r 2d Criminal Key Numbers. Criminal Law «=> 261(1), 
Law §§ 433 to 438. 263, 264. 
C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law ** 404, 
407. 411. 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except in case of an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court, 
and shall not be required to plead until he has had a reasonable time to confer 
with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by 
reason of insanity or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the 
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant re-
mses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall 
enter a plea of not guilty. 
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R u l e 11 UTAH KULKS OK TRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the cour. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith b? 
set for trial. Defendants unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In non-felony cases the court shall advise the defendant, or hi? 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest and shaL 
not accept such a plea until the court has made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by counsel he has know-
ingly waived his right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory self-
incrimination, to a jury trial and to confront and cross-examine in open 
court the witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he waives 
all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which he is entering the plea; that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reason-
able doubt; and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence 
that may be imposed upon him for each offense to which a plea is entered, 
including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and 
plea agreement and if so, what agreement has been reached. 
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser in-
cluded offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the same shall be ap-
proved by the court. If recommendations as to sentence are allowed by the 
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any recommen-
dation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(f) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any agree-
ment being made by the prosecuting attorney, but once a tentative plea agree-
ment has been reached which contemplates entry of a plea in the expectation 
tha t other charges will be dropped or dismissed, the judge, upon request of the 
parties, may permit the disclosure to him of such tentative agreement and the 
reasons therefor in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may 
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether he will 
approve the proposed disposition. Thereafter, if the judge decides that final 
disposition should not be handled in conformity with the plea agreement, he 
shall so advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm 
or withdraw his plea. 
(77-35-11, enacted by L. 1980, ch 14, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 49, § 6.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
ment, in Subdivision <b». added "not guilty by 
reason of insanity or guilty and menlallv ill" to 
the first sentence and added the second sen-
tence 
Cross-References. — Inadmissibility of 
pleas, plea discussions or related statements. 
Rule 410, U.R.E. 
350 
